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WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK 
ABOUT SHAREHOLDER WEALTH  
MAXIMIZATION 
Eric Franklin Amarante* 
Professor Stefan Padfield’s The Role of Corporate Personality Theory in 
Opting Out of Shareholder Wealth Maximization proposes a novel approach 
to the ongoing shareholder wealth maximization debate.1 Specifically, 
Padfield posits that an exploration of corporate personality theory might 
provide some clarity on the ability of for-profit corporations to privately 
order around the shareholder wealth maximization norm.2 Ultimately, 
Padfield argues that certain corporate personality theories support pri-
vate ordering around the shareholder wealth maximization norm while 
others do not.3 Because of the varying levels of support, Padfield argues 
that a participant in the shareholder wealth maximization debate would 
be wise to incorporate corporate personality theory into their arguments, 
as it provides ammunition for supporters of both sides of the argument.4  
I agree with Padfield’s thesis that an analysis of corporate per-
sonality theory can prove helpful for anyone engaging in a debate regard-
ing the ability of for-profit corporations to privately opt out of any 
shareholder wealth maximization norm. However, I disagree with Pad-
field’s implication that such an investigation will provide any clarity on 
the debate. Thus, my criticism is not about Padfield’s thesis. Rather, I 
take issue with an assumption implied in his piece—that we have defined 
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the metes and bounds of the shareholder wealth maximization norm in a 
manner sufficient to have a meaningful debate. This assumption is not 
peculiar to Padfield, as many scholars debate the existence of the norm 
without properly defining what the norm requires. Thus, my primary 
complaint concerning Padfield’s piece is that before we can properly 
weigh the value of corporate personality theory in debating the ability of 
for-profit corporations to privately opt out of the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm, we need to have a working definition of precisely 
what the norm requires.  
A.  The Limits of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Debate 
The shareholder wealth maximization norm has captured the at-
tention of business law scholars for years. Given this attention, it’s rea-
sonable to wonder how we still find ourselves lacking consensus. Schol-
ars as prominent as Professor Lynn Stout5 and Professor Stephen Bain-
bridge6 have wrestled with the issue and come out on opposite sides. 
Professor Joan MacLeod Heminway nicely encapsulates the state of the 
debate when she notes that “[c]ommentators from the academy (law and 
business) and practice (lawyers and judges) have taken various views on 
[the shareholder wealth maximization] norm—ranging from characteriz-
ing the norm as nonexistent or oversimplified to maintaining it as simple 
fact.”7 
Inspired by this failure to reach consensus, Heminway reframes 
the debate in Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of Statutes, Deci-
sional Law, and Organic Documents, a piece on which Padfield relies heavily.8 
In Heminway’s article, as the title suggests, she examines the shareholder 
                                                 
5 Lynn Stout, Corporations Don’t Have to Maximize Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/16/what-are-corporations-
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2017]                             SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION                            457 
wealth maximization norm from the perspective of state corporate stat-
utes, relevant judicial decisions, and corporate governing documents. 
Implied in the thesis of the piece is a critique of the shareholder wealth 
maximization debate.9 Because “much of the debate over a shareholder 
wealth maximization norm focuses on theory and policy,” Delaware law, 
or from the perspective of a “broad-based, state-oriented doctrinal view-
point,” Heminway proffers that the conversation would benefit from a 
focus on “firm-level corporate governance—the point at which applica-
ble corporate governance law theory, policy, and doctrine intersect with a 
firm’s organic documents.”10 With this focus, Heminway engages in an 
exhaustive investigation, ultimately concluding that neither decisional nor 
statutory law definitively supports the existence of the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm.11 However, she is quick to point out that the 
lack of statutory or decisional law does not mean that corporations may 
ignore the norm.12  
Inspired by Heminway’s call to clarify and examine the statutory 
and decisional sources of the shareholder wealth maximization norm, I 
would like to ask an even more fundamental question: what, precisely, do 
we mean when we say shareholder wealth maximization? Rather than 
asking whether directors are restricted by the shareholder wealth maxi-
mization norm, I question if we even know what such a norm would re-
quire. Ultimately, I argue that the answer is less definite than one would 
hope. And this indeterminacy suggests that the argument over the exist-
ence of a shareholder wealth maximization norm is a bit beside the point 
if we cannot define what it requires. And more to the point, Padfield’s 
call to examine corporate personality theory to determine the ability to 
                                                 
9 See id. at 939–44. 
10 Id. at 939–40, 942. 
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privately opt out of the norm is similarly premature until we can settle on 
a definition.  
B.  By the Way, None of This Matters 
Before examining the lack of definitional certainty concerning the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm, I’ll briefly note why it does not 
really matter if it exists or what it might require. This is because the busi-
ness judgment rule renders the existence and content of the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm virtually meaningless. Although the precise 
contours of the business judgment rule may be up to debate,13 one might 
confidently say that it “protects the [business] decisions of corporate 
leaders from subsequent challenge by shareholders or stakeholders who 
may ultimately disagree.”14 The justification is that “courts are ill 
equipped to engage in post hoc substantive review of business decisions.”15 
Absent evidence of “fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing,” a “presumption 
[exists that the Board] exercised sound business judgment ‘in the honest 
belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company.’”16 
Thus, if a board member of a for-profit corporation is haunted by the 
specter of the shareholder wealth maximization norm, the director need 
only to reframe the action in question with a view toward the bottom 
line.17 In such a case, the business judgment rule will insulate the director 
from any shareholder challenge.18  
For example, imagine that a board member is considering dedi-
cating some corporate profits to help the homeless population in the 
corporate headquarters’ hometown. Spending corporate profits in such a 
manner might run afoul of the shareholder wealth maximization norm. 
After all, that money could hire more employees, purchase advertise-
                                                 
13 See Padfield, supra note 1, at 424–25. 
14 TODD J. CLARK AND ANDRÉ DOUGLAS POND CUMMINGS, CORPORATE JUSTICE 13 
(Carolina Academic Press 2016). 
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17 See id.  
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ments, or more apropos, fund a shareholder dividend. But the director 
can cleanse this decision of any impropriety if the director can simply 
provide a colorable business purpose. If the director were to, for exam-
ple, justify the decision by highlighting the positive press the corporation 
would receive, the decision would not offend the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm. After all, the director made the decision to improve 
the public opinion of the corporation, which might result in a concomi-
tant rise in shareholder value. The justification does not change the re-
sult: a for-profit corporation spends money on the homeless and the ex-
penditure does not offend the shareholder wealth maximization norm.  
The ease with which a board can avoid the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm (however defined), robs the debate of much urgen-
cy.19 However, the next section will argue that even if the business judg-
ment rule allows a board to easily avoid the constraints of the sharehold-
er wealth maximization norm, the norm itself remains ill-defined to such 
a degree that it provides little, if any, guidance for either directors or 
courts. 
C.  Defining Shareholder, Wealth, and Maximization 
This section will argue that each of the words in the phrase 
“shareholder wealth maximization” lacks sufficient definition to provide 
any reasonable guidance for those debating the existence of a norm, 
much less to the directors expected to limit their activities in accordance 
with the norm. 
Although it might appear to be little more than definitional 
gamesmanship, “shareholder” does not have a definite meaning in the 
context of the shareholder wealth maximization norm. Unless one refers 
to a single shareholder, there is little hope in identifying a solitary interest 
of a group as disparate as any given collection of shareholders. To make 
                                                 
19 Padfield, supra note 1, at 424, 437. The business judgment rule is why Padfield can 
confidently state the following two seemingly opposing statements: (i) no reasonable 
attorney “would risk money that mattered to them retrying the Dodge case on behalf of 
Ford” and (ii) it is “relatively easy for boards to avoid accountability for ignoring any 
duty to maximize shareholder value by simply appending a colorable pro-shareholder-
value story to any action taken.”  
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the point painfully clear, one shareholder’s interests may not be in line 
with another shareholder’s. Shareholders are nothing more than “human 
beings who happen to own shares, and human beings have different in-
terests and different values.”20 For example, one shareholder may place a 
higher value on the corporation’s community standing than another, 
while another shareholder might place a higher value on the well-being 
of the corporation’s employees. Although upon first blush it may seem 
facile, it bears stating that people are different from one another. Or to 
put it in more economic terms, “shareholders are heterogeneous and do 
not have a unitary maximizing incentive.”21 It is therefore a bit disingen-
uous to speak of “shareholders” as having a singular set of desired ends. 
Or in the words of Professor Stout, “[s]hareholder primacy looks at the 
world from the perspective of the Platonic shareholder who only cares 
about one company’s share price, at one moment in time. Yet no such 
Platonic entity exists.”22 
Similar to “shareholder,” the word “wealth” is deceptive in that it 
suggests a clear and finite meaning. But in this context, wealth can have a 
number of meanings. While financial or pecuniary wealth is the most ob-
vious, a shareholder might find great personal satisfaction in a corpora-
tion’s provision of high-paying jobs to a particular community. On the 
other hand, a shareholder might think that a corporation’s practice of 
sourcing products locally as a measure of wealth. As Heminway notes, 
“shareholder wealth maximization theory focuses almost exclusively on 
financial wealth (i.e., pecuniary gain or profit), as opposed to other 
measures of satisfaction or benefit derived by shareholders from their 
equity ownership.”23 
Some might find it strange that “wealth” would refer to anything 
other than financial or pecuniary gain. But consider the early sharehold-
                                                 
20 Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth, EUROPEAN FINANCIAL REVIEW, Apr.-May 
2013. 
21 William W. Bratton & Simone M. Sepe, Shareholder Power and Incomplete Markets, 40 
(Sept. 28, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author, used by permission). 
22 Stout, supra note 20.  
23 Heminway, supra note 7, at 943. 
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ers of Ben & Jerry’s before the company was sold to multinational giant 
Unilever.24 In its early years, rather than turning to more traditional ven-
ture capital financing to raise funds, the company instead sold shares to 
Vermont residents to emphasize and ensure local ownership.25 These 
shareholders were part owners of “a social enterprise icon” that was “fair 
to its employees, easy on the environment, and kind to its cows.”26 It is 
reasonable to assume such shareholders valued the company’s ethical 
practices highly, perhaps even more highly than financial wealth. This 
would represent an alternate measure of shareholder value–something 
other than the “pecuniary gain or profit” that Heminway references.27 If 
the shareholders of such a company were faced with a lucrative acquisi-
tion offer, they might vote against the transaction if the buyer were not 
dedicated to the company’s responsible business practices.28 This proves 
that the shareholder heterogeneity discussed above extends to what a 
particular shareholder might or might not consider “wealth.” 
Finally, the word “maximization” shares the lack of definitional 
certainty that plagues both “shareholder” and “wealth.” As noted above, 
the heterogeneity of shareholders makes it very difficult to pin down a 
                                                 
24Anthony Page & Robert A. Katz, The Truth About Ben & Jerry’s, STANFORD SOC. IN-
NOVATION REVIEW (Fall 2012), ssir.org/articles/entry/the_truth_about_ben_and_ 
jerrys (stating that at the time, Unilever was “the world’s third-largest consumer goods 
company, described by one commentator as ‘a giant multinational clearly focused on 
the financial bottom line.’”). 
25 Amy Cortese, Seeking Capital, Some Companies Turn to ‘Do-It-Yourself I.P.O.’s’, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 31, 2013) (“[I]n 1984, two young entrepreneurs raised a first round of capi-
tal for their fledgling ice cream company in an intrastate offering. With the slogan ‘Get 
a scoop of the action,’ Ben & Jerry’s raised $750,000 from 1,800 ice-cream-loving Ver-
monters, allowing them to build a new plant and expand.”). 
26 Page & Katz, supra note 24. 
27 Heminway, supra note 7, at 943. 
28 Page & Katz, supra note  24 (noting that the Ben & Jerry’s shareholders were under 
no legal compulsion to accept a lucrative offer to purchase their shares and that “[a]s 
shareholders, they were entitled to enjoy the benefits of selfish ownership, which ironi-
cally in this context could have been exercised altruistically to maintain the company’s 
social mission.”). 
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singular goal.29 Does maximization refer to quarterly earnings, or does 
maximization require a more long-term view? When you have sharehold-
ers that hold stock for as little as a few hours, is it possible to maximize 
their interests while simultaneously maximizing the interests of share-
holders planning to hold the stock for a longer period of time? As Pro-
fessor Bratton points out, “[t]he shareholder disaggregates among short-
term types, long-term types, information traders, and liquidity traders. 
There is accordingly no basis for presuming that shareholder incentives 
are aligned with maximization of fundamental value.”30 
Given this lack of definition, it is little wonder that corporate 
scholars have failed to find consensus. And this is precisely the reason 
why I am not convinced that Padfield’s suggestion will provide any clari-
ty in the debate. If a particular corporate personality theory supports the 
private ordering out of the shareholder wealth maximization norm, we 
have not accomplished anything if we do not have a shared understand-
ing of what “shareholder wealth maximization” requires.  
I do, however, agree with Padfield’s ultimate thesis. A clear un-
derstanding of the corporate personality theories will provide a toehold 
from which to launch arguments for or against the ability to opt out of 
the shareholder wealth maximization norm. But because we have not yet 
agreed upon a shared definition of the term “shareholder wealth maxi-
mization,” I do not think an exploration of corporate personality theory 
will bring us closer to determining the ultimate issue (i.e., whether a 
statement in a charter or the bylaws might permit opting out of the 
norm). It certainly provides arguments for why or why not the private 
ordering should affect the applicability of the norm, but without settling 
on a definition of what, precisely, the norm requires, I fear that the en-
deavor will not prove very illuminating. 
 
                                                 
29 See Bratton & Sepe, supra note 21. 
30 Id. 
